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Abstract 
The experimental evidence in this collection of papers is sufficient for organizations to take 
action—at least with respect to investigating or testing alternative pay schemes. Some 
organizations have already implemented a number of these procedures. The failure of an 
organization’s directors to follow evidence-based procedures for executive pay might be used as 
a basis for legal action by shareholders when results are detrimental to a firm. 
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With the exception of Christopher Armstrong, the commentaries are largely sympathetic to the 
conclusions in Jacquart and Armstrong (2013).  The difference arises primarily because 
Armstrong (2013) focused on non-experimental findings, an issue that we examine in our main 
paper. He also questioned the feasibility of conducting realistic experiments.  
Can one generalize from experimental findings about pay practices? 
Experimental findings have been challenged in many important areas. The primary objection is 
that the findings, especially from laboratory experiments, lack realism. Locke (1986) addressed 
the generalizability of laboratory experiments by asking researchers in 11 areas of human and 
organizational behavior to compare the findings from laboratory experiments with those from 
field experiments. The findings from each approach showed much agreement. Economists have 
also made the case for the generalizability of experiments (Camerer 2011; Falk and Heckman 
2012). 
The standard approach for assessing decision-making in realistic conditions is to use role-
playing (e.g., “you are the CEO of company X and you face the following situation”). Armstrong 
(2001) provides a description of how to use role-playing for prediction, along with evidence on 
its predictive validity. For example, Green (2005) found that college students made similar 
decisions to those in eight actual (disguised) situations when asked to play the role of top 
executives.  
Natural experiments can provide useful evidence such as through changes in government 
regulations. For example, in an effort to strengthen the contractual right of owners, the 2010 
Dodd-Frank regulation includes a provision that firms’ owners be given the right to cast a “non-
binding” advisory vote at least once every three years on whether to approve the compensation 
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of the five highest-paid executives, the so-called “say-on-pay” (SOP) provision. In the first two 
years, firms using SOP had lower CEO compensation and better financial performance than 
firms not using SOP (Kimbro and Xu 2013).  
How should performance be assessed? 
Christopher Armstrong raises the issue of how to assess performance. He presents evidence that 
executive compensation—in terms of overall wealth rather than annual pay—is related to firms’ 
performance. In contrast, Hogarth and Kolev (2013) suggest that attention should be given to 
how current pay affects future performance. Answering this question with nonexperimental data, 
they found that total compensation was negatively correlated to future performance. 
We conclude that outcomes should not be used as a measure of performance. Indeed, 
using them as such is likely to be harmful. For example, many companies use market-share as a 
performance measure although it is inconsistent with the belief that firms should maximize 
profits. Experimental evidence has shown that competitor-oriented objectives like market-share 
are harmful (Armstrong and Green 2007).  
Performance incentives harm performance (Deci and Ryan 2013). They also harm 
learning in firms where knowledge and skills are important (Seijts and Latham 2005). Deci and 
Ryan (2013) suggests a solution: focus on behaviors, rather than financial performance. Such an 
approach is used, for example, to assess the performance of medical doctors. When things go 
badly, doctors are likely to be sued for failing to use evidence-based procedures.  
Few top executives rely on evidence-based methods. Consider the ability to plan, an 
important skill for top executives. Although evidence-based procedures for corporate planning 
are available (Armstrong 1982a), few executives use this knowledge (Armstrong and Reibstein 
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1985). In particular, executives often fail to use proper procedures for setting objectives. Locke 
and Latham (2002) describe how to properly set objectives, using findings from decades of 
research. 
Rather than following evidence-based procedures, Jack Welch, former Chairman and 
CEO of General Electric, advised executives to go with their gut feelings when making 
important decisions. His approach seems to have been met with much agreement. Now imagine a 
medical doctor trying to defend a poor decision because if felt good.  
Should Firms Take Action on the Recommendations? 
As Jones (2013) notes, many industrial economists have analyzed the Mondragon experience. 
Firms adopting these solutions have been more successful than those using traditional executive 
pay practices for well over half a century. Those needing more evidence should commission 
experiments that could be done at a fraction of the cost of selecting a single CEO. 
Organizations can change their pay procedures by first asking key people if they would 
be willing to consider changes in any aspects of the executive payment plan. If not, there is no 
use to proceed. If yes, work with them to (1) identify the possible areas for change, (2) develop 
alternative procedures, (3) describe the evidence necessary for change and (4) obtain the evidence. 
Armstrong (1982b) summarizes evidence related to this approach.  
Conclusions 
As with medicine, experimental studies provide the gold standard for studying problems in 
complex, uncertain areas. Much has been learned about the expected effects of payment schemes 
from experiments to date. 
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Organizations in a variety of industries and countries have successfully applied these 
solutions for decades. Given the evidence, we expect more organizations will do so in the future.  
When things go poorly, Pfeffer (2013) suggests that organizations apply sanctions when 
top executives fail to follow evidence-based procedures. For example, shareholders could file 
lawsuits against executives who are unable to demonstrate that they followed proper procedures 
and merely went with their gut. 
Online Supplement 
An online supplement to this paper is available as part of the online version that can be found at 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.2013.0705 
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